We show that in a simple price-setting game with one large firm and many small firms the large firm does not accept the role of the price leader.
Introduction
Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) gave a game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer's model of dominant-firm price leadership in the framework of a capacity constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly. According to Forchheimer's model we have one large firm and many small firms in the market. The large firm is assumed to set the price in the market, while the small firms act as price takers.
We gave another microfoundation of Forchheimer's model in a previous paper (Tasnádi, 2000) in a market with one 'large' firm and infinitely many 'small' firms, where we assumed strictly convex cost functions and the large firm to be the exogenously given first mover. Now we want to investigate whether the large firm accepts the role of the first mover. Since analyzing the question of endogenous timing in the market with infinitely many firms leads to a quite difficult task, we consider a market with only finitely many firms.
We show that we obtain a game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer's model if the large firm is the exogenously given first mover (Proposition 1). Hence, to obtain an implementation in subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in case of strictly convex cost functions it is not necessary to take infinitely many small firms. However, analyzing a simple two-period timing game, we obtain that the large firm does not accept the role of the first mover (Theorem 1). This contradicts our intuition that a price-setting game with one large firm and sufficiently many small firms should lead to Forchheimer's model, and we conjecture that other variables beside price are needed to derive Forchheimer's model.
The framework
We impose the following assumptions on the demand function. ). For some prices we might have zero supply whenever firm i has fixed costs. The following assumption ensures that all firms will be active in the market.
In our model firm 0 should play the role of the dominant firm, whereas the remaining firms should form the competitive fringe. We denote the set of these latter firms by Ω 
n+1 that we will call from now on a price profile. The supply of pro-
In our pricesetting game we assume efficient rationing of consumers (for more details on efficient rationing we refer to Tirole, 1988) . Thus, we define the demand served by the firms in the following manner:
for firm 0. The definitions (1) and (2) assume that firm 0 serves the consumers at a given price level after the remaining firms have already sold their supply. We impose this assumption only for the technical reason of avoiding the need to have a competitive fringe setting their prices arbitrarily close to, but below, the dominant firm's price. Now we define the profit functions to be . From now on we call firm 0 the large firm and the remaining firms small firms, which is justified by the following assumption. 
Assumption 4 ensures that if all firms with the exception of one small firm, which sets a higher price, set the same price p ∈ p L , b , then the entire demand can be satisfied without this exceptional small firm.
Endogenous timing of price decisions
Suppose that the firms can choose between two time periods to make their price announcement. After the firms have made their timing decisions, which they all observe, they will play the corresponding price-setting game. A similar timing game has been investigated by Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) and by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) . First, we consider the case in which the large firm moves in period 1, while the remaining firms all move in period 2. Proof. We already noted that the large firm will not set its price below p (3); a contradiction. Thus, A has at least two elements. Hence, any firm in A is interested in undercutting p H . Therefore, the only possible equilibrium of the subgame is p. Moreover, p is an equilibrium of the subgame because if any producer raises its price unilaterally above p, then the demand it faces will be zero because of (3). Thus, the large firm sells
will not set its price below p, since at price p a firm in the fringe can sell its entire supply. In an analogous way to case (i) one can show that none of the small firms set their prices above p, which in turn implies that the large firm faces no demand at all and therefore, it will not set a price above or equal to p.
Finally, we conclude that the large firm sets its price by maximizing π r because it chooses its price from [p
L
, p] and for such prices the small firms behave as price takers.
Second, we turn to the simultaneous-move game, which has a mixedstrategy equilibrium by Maskin's (1986) Theorem 2. The next theorem es-2 In the simultaneous-move game we do not have to define the demand for the large firm and the small firms differently as in (1) For the case of a sufficiently asymmetric duopoly game we could even determine the outcome of the two-period timing game (Tasnádi, 2003) . However, for the oligopolistic case this turns out to be a very difficult task and remains an open problem.
